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ARGUMENT
POINT I
The lower court's ruling that Ms. Ross was within the course and scope of
her employment is erroneous.
The lower court's conclusion that the Salt Lake City police officer was within the course
and scope of her employment, under the circumstances of this case, is contrary to well-established
case law.
An employer can only be vicariously liable for its employee's actions if the employee's
conduct (1) was of the general kind the employee is employed to perform; (2) occurred within the
hours of the employee's work and spatial boundaries of the work; and (3) was motivated by the
purpose of serving the employer's interest. Clark v. Panagatu 998 P.2d 268, 272 (Utah 2000).
Moreover, "as a general rule," an employee is not in the course and scope of his employment
when he is going to and coming from work, and the parties acknowledge this. Wliitehead v.
Variable Life Annuity Life Insurance Co., 801 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989).1
The undisputed facts demonstrate Ms. Ross was not acting in the course and scope of her
employment as a police officer as a matter of law. First, she was not employed simply to drive her

*In explaining its support of the "coming and going" rule in Whitehead, this Court relied
on several cases from other jurisdictions, including Heide v. T.C.I., 506 P.2d 486 (Or. 1972), in
which the Oregon Supreme Court held that an employer was not vicariously liable for an
employee's negligence while driving home from work. Even though the employee had business
literature in her vehicle at the time of the accident, the court in Heide determined the employer
had no control over the employee when the accident occurred. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 936.
Plaintiffs assert that the City had control over Ms. Ross because she was required to carry
specified equipment in her car (Appellees' Brief, p. 6); however, it is clear the City had no
control over her activities or destination.
9

patrol car. Instead, she had more specific job duties as a police officer, such as investigating
suspicious criminal activity or making arrests, that were not dependent upon her operation of a
vehicle. Second, the accident did not occur within the time or space parameters of her work. As
soon as she left the meeting to go home, she left the time and space parameters of her work.
Third, she was not driving home to benefit the City. The City had no interest in where she chose
to drive after work. The City is not vicariously liable for Ms. Ross' actions because this is a
simple case of an employee driving home, placing her outside the course and scope of
employment.
The trial court incorrectly created an "employer-provided transportation" exception to the
coming-and-going rule in determining that Ms. Ross was in the course and scope of employment.
As the City points out, there is no precedent for this exception in Utah case law for third party
negligence cases. The only support Plaintiffs offer for this exception comes from workers'
compensation law, which is of little use because "course and scope" carries far broader meaning
in the workers' compensation context than in the vicarious liability context. The employerprovided transportation exception in workers' compensation cases is not surprising due to the
purpose behind workers' compensation laws of providing compensation for injured employees
whenever possible:
An expansive definition has been given to the phrase "in the course and scope of
employment" as used in the workers' compensation statute, because the policy
goal is to provide prompt but limited compensation to a worker for her accidentrelated expenses and to facilitate a speedy return of that worker to her job
regardless of the placement of fault for the injury . . . . [In the vicarious liability
context] [t]he conduct of a servant is within the "scope of his employment" only if
it is of the kind he is employed to perform, it occurs substantially within authorized
3

time and space limits and is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the
master.
Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Akin, 533 So.2d 829, 831-32 (Fla. App. 1988); accord Bennett v.
Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 430 n.2 (Utah 1986) ("the purpose of agency law, to
define the limits of a master's vicarious liability for a servant's misdeeds, is entirely different from
effectuating the remedial purposes of the workmen's compensation acts . . . .") In the vastly
different context of determining whether to hold an employer responsible to a third party for its
employee's actions, it does not make sense to hinge this determination on who owns the vehicle.
The inquiry should instead focus on what the employee was doing in the vehicle when the
accident occurred.
Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized this distinction and deemed the employer's
provision of a vehicle irrelevant to vicarious liability. In Hanson v. Benel/i, 719 So.2d 627 (La.
App. 1998), the court reversed a judgment of vicarious liability against a city whose police officer
employee injured a third party while driving an unmarked police vehicle. The city owned the
vehicle but allowed the police officer to use it for personal purposes. The accident occurred when
he was driving home from a party. Hanson, 719 So.2d at 632. Like Ms. Ross, the officer in
Hanson considered himself on duty twenty four hours a day, and he was required to respond to a
crime at any time while driving the vehicle. Id. at 633. The City encouraged him to use the
vehicle as much as possible when not working in order to provide a crime deterrent. Id. at 633.
However, the court concluded that the city was not vicariously liable for his actions because he
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was "pursuing his own personal motives that night, with no connection in time, place or function
to his duties as a police officer . . . ." Id. at 634. The court explained that
[fjor us to affirm the finding that Lt. Benelli was in the course and scope of his
employment we must hold that a New Orleans police officer is in the course and
scope of his employment as a police officer whenever he is involved in an accident
driving a car owned by NOPD. Neither the policy behind the doctrine of
respondeat superior nor the jurisprudence support this proposition.
Id. at 634.
Similarly, in DiVecchio v. Mead Corp., 361 S.E.2d 850, 852 (Ga. App. 1987), the court
held that a manager driving a company vehicle home from a party celebrating a co-worker's
marriage was not in the course and scope of employment because he was "driving home for the
evening, a purely personal mission . . . ." DiVecchio, 361 S.E.JM ii K52. The injured victim
argued that the employer should be vicariously liable because it benefitted from his personal use of
the vehicle by reimbursing him for gas mileage and deducting it as a business expense. The court
considered this evidence insufficient to turn the employee's act of driving home into an act within
the scope of his employment. Id. at 852. See also Holland v. Westmar, Inc., 20 P.3d 149 (Okla.
App. 1999) (even in workers' compensation context, employees injured while driving company
vehicle to their homes were not in course and scope of employment because injury sustained in an
employer-provided vehicle is not compensable if employee is on a personal tup).
The coming-and-going rule is the law in Utah. There is no reason to apply an exception in
this case that otherwise only exists in workers' compensation situations. The fact that Ms. Ross
was in a vehicle provided by the City does not make her activity of driving home any less
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personal. She was outside the course and scope of her employment, and the City is not
vicariously liable.
POINT II
A rule that a police officer is within the course and scope of employment
while merely driving to or from work in an assigned police car will impose
significant financial costs on the employer.
If a police officer is within the course and scope of employment while merely driving to or
from work in an assigned police car while off-duty, significant financial liability will be imposed on
all cities and counties that have such a program. Those liabilities include:
A.

Workers' Compensation.

Under current case law, a person simply going to or from work, even in a vehicle
furnished by the employer without more, is not within the course and scope of employment, and
arguably not entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits for any injury that might occur in an
automobile accident. However, if the lower court's ruling is affirmed, governmental entities will
be obligated to pay Workers' Compensation benefits to any police officer who is injured as a
result of an automobile accident while simply driving to or from work. It would be required to
pay Workers' Compensation benefits in many more instances than it does now. Having no prior
experience data, West Valley City is uncertain of the exact increased cost over the years of paying
more Workers' Compensation claims, but it is sure to be substantial.
B.

Respondeat Superior Liability.

The lower court's ruling means that the city will be responsible under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for any accident that may occur while an off-duty policeman is driving to or
6

from work. Requiring the city to be liable up to the statutory limits under the Governmental
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34) of $500,000 per person and $1,000,000 per
occurrence, as opposed to only being liable for the minimum limits required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-12a-101, et seq. and § 31A-22-304 ($25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence), is an
obviously significant increase in the city's potential liability. Lacking experience data, West
Valley City is unsure of the exact amount of increased cost, but again, it is sure to be substantial.
C.

Fair Labor Standards Act Liability.

If an off-duty employee driving to or from work in an employer-provided vehicle is within
the course and scope of employment, substantial liability on the employer to pay additional
overtime or hourly compensation will be imposed. If such a rule is adopted by this Court, in the
case of West Valley City alone it is estimated that the cost to the City to provide such additional
compensation will be approximately $756,940.94 annually. In addition, the City may be liable for
back pay for the last two years (if the violation of FLSA is found to be unintentional), resulting in
a potential back-pay liability of $1,513,881.80. See Affidavit of Alan B. Kerstein, Exhibit A.
The potential financial liability to municipalities of the State of Utah could very well run
into the millions of dollars annually. West Valley City, and many other governmental entities, may
have to abandon the car-per-officer program as simply unaffordable.
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CONCLUSION
The district court decision herein should be reversed, not just because it is contrary to
prevailing Utah case law, but because affirmance thereof will have significant adverse practical,
financial and social consequences.
DATED this _l_H^day of April, 2002.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

(f.ik^j
ALLAN L. LARSON
IANNE P. BLANCH
Attorneys for Amicus West Valley City
N: 13607 516MC AMICUS.
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M. David Eckersley, Esq.
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175 East 400 South, Suite 900
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Attorneys for Appellee
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Snell & Wilmer
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
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Attorneys for Michelle Ross
Steven W. Allred, Esq.
Chief Deputy City Attorney
451 South State Street, Suite 505
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Attorneys for Appellant

N:\13607\516\MC\AMICUS.
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Exhibit A

ALLAN L. LARSON (A 1896)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Amicus West Valley City, et al.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Fax No.: (801)363-0400

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHAD AHLSTROM and STACY
AHLSTROM,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

AFFIDAVIT OF ALAN B. KERSTEIN

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,

Case No. 20010830

Defendant and Appellant..

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, Alan B. Kerstein, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1.

I am over the age of twenty-one and have personal knowledge of the information set

forth below.
2.

I am the Chief of Police for West Valley City Municipal Corporation.

3.

There are currently 172 sworn police officers who are "non-exempt" employees under

the Fair Labor Standards Act in the West Valley City Police Department who have authority to drive
their City police vehicles to and from work and/or use said vehicles for personal use, when said
officers are not "on duty."
4.

The average hourly wage rate for a non-exempt police officer in West Valley City is

SI 9.67, and the average number of work days worked per year per officer is 181 days.
5.

Non-exempt officers driving a West Valley City police vehicle reside at varying

distances from the West Valley City Police Department, some in excess of 25 miles. Average daily
commute times range from about one-half hour for approximately 135 officers, three quarters of an
hour for 3 officers, one hour for 20 officers, and slightly over one hour for 14 officers. Multiplying
the number of officers times the average commute time per day, times the 181 days worked per year,
results in total hours spent in driving to and from work to be 29,538 hours per year.
6.

It is also conservatively estimated that officers having access to a City police car will

use that vehicle at least one hour per week for personal use, training, going to court, etc. One
hundred seventy-two employees at one hour per week, times 52 weeks per year, equals 8,944 hours
per year.
7.

Based upon the foregoing, the additional potential cost to the City to compensate

officers for personal and commuting use is calculated by multiplying the average hourly rate ($19.67)
times 38,482 hours, which equals $756,940.94
8.

In addition, it is my understanding that in the event of an unintentional violation of the

federal Fair Labor Standards Act, back pay may be awarded for two years, which would result in an
additional potential liability to the City of approximately $1,513,881.80.

DATED this J^

day of April, 2002.

%hmL^
AlanB. Kerstein
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

It* day of April, 2002.

c^m\.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
JOAN M. HANSON
3600 So. Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City. Utah 84119
My Commission Expires

November 13, 2002

STATE OF UTAH
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